Today's state-of-the-art image classi ers fail to correctly classify carefully manipulated adversarial images. In this work, we develop a new, localized adversarial a ack that generates adversarial examples by imperceptibly altering the backgrounds of normal images. We rst use this a ack to highlight the unnecessary sensitivity of neural networks to changes in the background of an image, then use it as part of a new training technique: localized adversarial training. By including locally adversarial images in the training set, we are able to create a classi er that su ers less loss than a non-adversarially trained counterpart model on both natural and adversarial inputs. e evaluation of our localized adversarial training algorithm on MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets shows decreased accuracy loss on natural images, and increased robustness against adversarial inputs.
INTRODUCTION
Since the advent of machine learning to the eld of computer vision, image classi cation so ware has surpassed human capabilities and enabled new technologies including facial recognition authentication, self-driving cars, and smart security cameras [1] . However, a unique challenge threatens these technologies: the existence of images which appear normal to humans, but reliably fool image classi ers [19] . Because convolutional neural networks (CNNs) tend to focus on minor and easily manipulated details, a acks such as the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [5] , and its iterative counterpart, Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [7] , have been able to reliably generate such adversarial examples by reverse engineering the training process. In the same way a classi er's weights are updated to minimize its loss during training, adversarial a acks seek to maximize a classi ers' loss by carefully altering images.
Adversarial examples are a double-edged sword. On the one hand, they provide a unique angle for studying the learning process of neural networks. Because they allow us to follow the progression of an image as it changes from one class to another, adversarial examples can be helpful for understanding and interpreting decision boundaries. is information can be used for building more accurate classi ers, and might enable model-based optimization [15] .
On the other hand, adversarial examples pose a potentially existential threat to the safety of vision-dependent technologies. If image classi ers can be fooled, then so can the technologies that use them. Adversarial a acks have already been experimented with against self-driving cars and facial recognition authentication.
Adversarial training, the process of including adversarial examples in the training set, is one popular defense [5] . However, while this technique has been shown to improve the robustness of a classi er against adversarial examples, the inclusion of adversarial images in the training process weakens classi ers' accuracy on natural (unaltered) images [20] [16] . Building classi ers that maintain state-of-the-art accuracy on both natural and adversarial examples is a key challenge in image classi cation, as a solution would provide defense as well as insight into the nature of CNNs [20] .
We present a simple solution: localized adversarial training (LAT). LAT is a training tactic that focuses the classi er on certain regions in an image. Because CNNs' weights are based on every pixel of every training image, CNNs are frequently backgroundfocused [14] . By including adversarial backgrounds in the training set, we train the model to focus on the object more than the background, in turn increasing the robustness of the classi er on both adversarial and natural examples. We successfully implemented this strategy with the MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets, creating models that outperform a traditional classi er. For the MNIST models, the localized adversarial training decreased the accuracy loss by 4.35% on natural inputs and at least 99% on all a empted adversarial inputs. For the CIFAR-10 models, loss decreased by 1.63% on natural inputs and 15.98% on adversarial inputs.
Contributions
We rst show that image classi ers may be unnecessarily dependent on image backgrounds, then develop a technique that focuses training on image foregrounds. Our contributions are as follows:
• We conduct, to our knowledge, the rst adversarial a ack that is restricted to making limited changes to only background pixels. We run this a ack against Inception v3 on nine images, bringing its accuracy to 0.00%.
• We implement a whitebox version of this a ack against an MNIST classi er, bringing its accuracy from 99.19% to 0.08%, and against a CIFAR-10 model, bringing its accuracy from 95.17% to 59.26%.
• We design a new, localized adversarial training technique that introduces adversarial backgrounds into training.
• We test our algorithm extensively on MNIST and CIFAR-10. In contrast to most adversarial models, which perform be er on adversarial examples and worse on natural examples, the locally adversarial models performed be er on both.
e rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines related work on adversarial a acks. Section 3 discusses our unique localized a ack and benchmarks its e ectiveness. In Section 4 we introduce our localized adversarial training process, and in Section 5 we implement and evaluate this training process. Section 6 discusses potential challenges for future work, and Section 7 o ers our nal conclusions.
RELATED WORKS
e observation that imperceptible changes could reliably fool image classi ers was rst made in 2014 [19] . More e ective and reliable a acks, such as FGSM [5] and PGD [7] , were subsequently introduced. PGD, one of the strongest white-box a acks against CNNs [10] , is the a ack used in this paper. PGD a acks change each pixel in order to maximize the loss of the classi er, then "clip" the changes to ensure that no pixel changes more than a given distance ϵ. It continues this process for a speci ed number of steps, each time modifying the image slightly to increase the loss of the classi er on that image. Further optimization-based a acks have been described [4] [8], including localized adversarial a acks, or a acks where only certain pixels are altered.
Such research has explored which pixels have the biggest impact in creating adversarial examples [11] , how many pixels must be changed to fool a classi er [13] , whether a classi er can be fooled with a single pixel [17] or patch [3] [6] , and which pixels can be changed the most while leaving the changes imperceptible to a human [9] . e isolation of adversarial changes to a speci c region allows for the testing of speci c hypotheses. For instance, using a localized a ack to explore the weaknesses of deep neural networks [11] or the transferability of a acks in a black-box se ing [6] . Localized a acks are also relevant in real-world adversarial a acks. Since an a acker can rarely alter an entire scene, physical adversarial patches [3] [7] o er a practical means to fool an object detector or image classi er. Defenses have also been proposed for localized a acks [12] .
LOCALIZED ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS ON BACKGROUND PIXELS
e localized a acks and defenses mentioned above and in Section 2 all have one of two qualities: either they focus on pixels not belonging to the object being detected, or they do not "clip" their changes to stay within a certain distance from the original image. None of the a acks which leave the main object in the image unaltered also limit the amount of noise that can be added to any other pixel. In this sense, our a ack is unique. We explore the e ectiveness of a acks that are localized to the background while still a empting to restrict the perceptibility of the changes by constraining the maximum alteration of any pixel.
To get a benchmark for whether or not localized and imperceptible adversarial a acks can be e ective, we conduct a white-box a ack on an Inception v3 image classi er [18] . We rst use MobileNet to create a bounding box suggestion around the object, then use a PGD a ack adapted from [2] to maximize the loss of the classi er on that image. By se ing ϵ to zero for every pixel inside the bounding box, we keep all pixels belonging to the object unchanged and maximize the loss function only over the remaining pixels.
We run this a ack with nine 300x300 images on Inception v3, and nd that the correct class was not in the top ten guesses for any of the adversarial images, suggesting that this a ack is indeed e ective. For these locally adversarial images, the classi er's condence of the correct class is only .0002 on average, compared to the original con dence of .71 on the same natural inputs. Additionally, we nd that about 49.1% of the pixels are changed. Because the bounding-boxes are imperfect, a few of those pixels don't belong to the background and therefore would not be included in a pure localized adversarial-background a ack.
A few examples of the localized a ack process are included in Figure 1 . e images on the le are the unaltered (and correctly identi ed) images, the column in the middle is used for illustrating which pixels are altered, and the column on the right holds the (incorrectly identi ed) localized adversarial examples, which look almost identical to the images on the le but have adversarial background pixels. e results of this experiment are summarized in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 shows the classi er's guesses and condences for natural images, while Table 2 shows the same classi er's guesses and con dences for the locally adversarial examples generated by our a ack. Although this particular a ack was run on a limited number of locally adversarial examples, we include them as an illustration and use them as a benchmark to suggest the sensitivity of classi ers to changes in the background of an image. Figure 1 : Localized and Imperceptible Adversarial Attack. e rst image of each type is the unaltered, correctly identi ed image. e second image has any pixel outside the bounding box as black. e third, and incorrectly identi ed, image of each type has every pixel outside the bounding box as adversarial. e green bars represent correct guesses, and the height of each bar indicates the classi ers' con dence in that guess.
LOCALIZED ADVERSARIAL TRAINING
Because adversarial a acks expose such a glaring weakness in traditional image classi ers, it is prudent to judge the quality of a classi er not simply on its accuracy on natural inputs, but also on its robustness when faced with adversarial inputs. One particular method of achieving robustness for a classi er is adversarial training. In this section, we introduce our new localized adversarial training algorithm, which trains our classi er to focus on the foreground.
As mentioned in Section 1, a degree of robustness (as well as extra regularization [5] ) can be achieved by including adversarial examples in the training process. Because a classi er's weights are continually updated during training, adversarial training requires that newly generated adversarial examples be introduced at every step. is slowly trains the model to perceive adversarial examples and natural examples the same way, making it more resistant to unseen adversarial examples. However, despite the robustness of adversarially trained models, they are generally outperformed on natural inputs by their non-adversarially trained counterparts. is tradeo is explained in [20] as a result of the fact that the most accurate models rely on "non-robust features, " or features that are most subject to adversarial a acks. It is here that our localized a acks become most relevant: if a model is adversarially trained to discount irrelevant features (like the background, in many cases), then it may become more robust to adversarial changes in those features without su ering the same accuracy loss of a standard adversarially-trained model, which is trained to not rely heavily on any feature. e details of this procedure are found in Algorithm 1.
As described in Algorithm 1, LAT iterates through small batches of the training data, making each image in each batch adversarial. For each image, a PGD a ack generates and adds adversarial perturbations. en, the a ack is localized by creating a matrix of equal size to the image, denoted as epmatrix, where each value is ϵ if the corresponding pixel is altered, or zero otherwise. (In the next Section, we will describe in detail the di erent localized attacks we explored.) e adversarial image is then clipped, to ensure that its distance from the original image at any given pixel is no more than that pixel's corresponding value in the epsilon matrix (meaning that higher values of ϵ allow more visible changes at those pixels). Finally, once all the images in a batch are adversarial, the neural network is updated and trained to recognize those images correctly.
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Algorithm 1 Localized Adversarial Training
1: n is a CNN; ϵ is the maximum value that any pixel may legally change; attack describes which pixels may legally change 2: repeat for each minibatch B in training data 3: repeat for each image in B 4:
x ← ima e
5:
λ ← PGD A ack (x, n)
Noise generated by PGD a ack 6: x ← x + λ 7: epmatrix is initialized 8: epmatrix ←Localize (epmatrix, ϵ, attack) Changes are localized 9: x clipped to within x+epmatrix, x-epmatrix 10: replace original image in B with x 11: until every image in batch is altered 12: Train n on updated batch B 13: until training is complete
EVALUATION OF ROBUSTNESS AND ACCURACY
To test the robustness and accuracy of locally adversarially trained models, we train 3 CNN classi ers each for the CIFAR-10 and MNIST datasets. Each model is trained with two convolutional layers, a fully connected layer, and an output layer, and undergoes 100,000 steps of training. e rst model for each dataset is a "natural" model, which is trained on unaltered images. e "standard" model is trained on standard, traditional adversarial images, with every pixel altered. Finally, the "background" model is trained on locally adversarial images with the middle pixels unaltered. Each a ack is iterated over 100 steps, and ϵ is set to .3 for every pixel that is allowed to change.
Experiment Results
Evaluating each of the three models on each of the three inputs types yields a total of 9 results per model. e experiment conrms the trade-o between accuracy and robustness for standard adversarial training: while the MNIST model trained with the standard a ack su ered at least 99% less loss than the naturally trained model, it su ered 39.9% more loss on natural inputs. Similarly, while the CIFAR-10 standard adversarial model su ered 95.7% less loss on adversarial images, it su ered 88.9% more loss on natural images.
For both datasets, the "background" models outperformed the natural models, by 4.35% on natural MNIST inputs and over 99% on adversarial MNIST inputs. e "background" CIFAR-10 model also had improved performance in both categories, by 1.63% on natural inputs and 15.98% on adversarial inputs. Figure 2 describes the loss of each model when tested on natural inputs and each kind of adversarial input. Only the models which underwent LAT outperformed the "natural" model on all inputs.
DISCUSSION
We show that an MNIST and CIFAR-10 classi er can be improved with localized adversarial training. We also show the e ectiveness of localized adversarial a acks against complex, high-resolution e cross entropy loss of each model on natural inputs and each type of adversarial input. Loss on natural inputs is scaled by a factor of 1000 for MNIST and 100 for CIFAR-10.
image classi ers like Inception v3. Although we did not use LAT for more complex, higher-resolution image classi ers, our success with LAT on the MNIST and CIFAR-10 classi ers, as well as with the localized adversarial a ack against Inception v3, indicates that LAT is a promising next step to increase the accuracy and robustness of those classi ers as well. Because LAT can be implemented as a modi cation to preexisting adversarial training techniques, the main challenge for LAT is identifying which pixels should be changed. While it is computationally inexpensive to use semantic segmentation or foreground/background segregation on a low-resolution, black-and-white dataset like MNIST, it is much more computationally expensive to identify background pixels on high-resolution color images. A much cheaper approach is to leave the middle pixels unaltered, which, although e ective in our experiment, may not yield the same bene ts as a more exact masking approach when used on complex, high-resolution classi cation. Still, either strategy could still lead to improved accuracy on natural inputs compared to traditional adversarial training. Finally, we suggest that LAT may be an e ective tool to combat bias in deep learning. We used it to prevent image classi ers from focusing on the background, but it could just as easily be used to prevent a risk-calculator from focusing on elements like race or skin-color. We leave these applications for future work.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that CNN classi ers are o en too sensitive to changes in the background, and that this can be addressed by including images with adversarial backgrounds in the training set. is focuses the training on the image foregrounds, increasing accuracy and robustness. Localized adversarial training is cheap to implement and could have broad applications.
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